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This article tries to draw lessons from Chile for Zambia on innovative industrial 
policy and strategies that lead to industrial transformation and job creation. 
The creation of quality jobs for the increasingly skilled youth requires significant 
efforts. Industrial policy has been argued to have the potential to contribute to 
the creation of employment through support for new and old initiatives in the 
economy. In the case of Zambia, the economy has mainly been dominated by 
the mining sector, where the creation of jobs has been very small, whereas the 
comparator country Chile developed an institutional framework for industrial 
policy that addressed market failures and encouraged innovation concentrated 
in specific sectors. These were attainable given the country’s existing or potential 
comparative advantage and therefore had strong growth prospects and impacted 
on job creation. The study finds that Chile provides a rich experience that Zambia 
can learn from in creating labour intensive job opportunities especially for youths. 
Keywords:
Industrial policy, youth unemployment, industrial growth, state ownership, 
agribusiness, employment creation
Introduction
Zambia saw robust growth and increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows 
during the first fourteen years of this century. In contrast, employment creation 
has been sluggish. Unemployment remained high, averaging 15% (World Bank, 
2014). New jobs were only being created in the informal sector. In 2014, the 
informal sector comprised 89.3% of total employment. Youth unemployment 
remained high, estimated at 26% (World Bank, 2014). The large and growing 
youthful population continues to pose serious socio-economic challenges. 
Therefore, there is need to create sufficient jobs to absorb the increasing 
number of youths who will be seeking jobs. The creation of high quality jobs for 
the youth requires significant innovative efforts by policymakers. 
The rationale for the use of innovative industrial policy for job creation 
and structural transformation is robust. Industrial policies that support a 
1
Industrial Policy in Context; Comparative Experiences from Chile and Zambia
2
range of activities increase the potential for structural transformation and the 
creation of more jobs (Rodrik, 2010). This is exhibited by the decline of low-
productivity agriculture and low value added extractive activities, and a relative 
increase in manufacturing and high-productivity services sectors. Despite failed 
industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, evidence from Chile shows that the 
State is critical in influencing an industrialisation process that creates jobs. 
The question that arises is how Chile supported specific sectors of 
the economy, while at the same time avoiding the risk of creating “white 
elephants”. The purpose of this paper is to draw experiences from Zambia and 
Chile on innovative industrial policy and strategies that can lead to industrial 
transformation and job creation. It looks at an industrial policy and strategy that 
focuses on job creation and the role of the State. The rest of the paper is organised 
as follows. Section 2 provides the methodological motivation. Employment 
and industrial growth are presented in Section 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 
looks at the overview of Zambia’s industrial policy. Key sectors are identified in 
Section 6, while the comparative experiences from Chile are drawn in Section 7. 
The conclusion of the paper is in Section 8. 
Methodological Motivation
Industrial policy is a set of measures and strategies that promote structural 
change. Broadly, “industrial policies refer to restructuring policies in favour 
of more dynamic activities generally, regardless of whether those are located 
within industry or manufacturing per se” (Timmer et al, 2012). These policies 
and strategies can transform an economy from primary production to value 
added and diversified production. To increase productivity and create jobs, 
industrial policies and strategies must not only concentrate on exploiting a 
country’s comparative advantage, but must also support a range of activities 
that will stimulate development and promote the creation of new jobs (Rodrik, 
2010). 
To create dynamic industrial growth, industrial policy and strategy 
must meet three core principles (observed from successful countries) that 
form our analytical framework (Rodrik, 2010). Firstly, a state of mind rather 
than outlines of objectives: Industrial policy has to be an interactive process 
between the State and private businesses to create “social capital” conducive 
to investment. This embedment of the State in the private sector is essential 
for sharing ideas necessary for the State to improve its selective and functional 
policy interventions for the private sector to flourish (Ndulo, 2015). The high-
level interaction between the State and private actors helps in identifying the 
requisite State interventions that largely depend on the level of development 
and nature of the industry. For this to succeed active policies are required that 
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provide incentives, direction, and coordination within policy makers and the 
private sector; and between them. 
Secondly, a successful industrial policy should be anchored on special 
incentives that have well defined access rules and output indicators (Rodrik, 
2010). The strategy must be to provide a combination of incentives and 
compulsion. This suggests that incentive systems for new investors must 
be temporary and optional. Failure to meet their objectives must attract 
punishment. The intensity of such carrots and sticks could differ across industry 
and over time depending on government policy. Several incentives ranging from 
tax holidays, geographical location, subsidies, and trade-based incentives could 
be given. 
Thirdly, industrial policy should cultivate a favourable environment for 
growth and development benefiting the entire society as opposed to a few 
privileged bureaucrats (Rodrik, 2010). This requires an accountable and 
transparent process of implementing the industrial policy and the associated 
incentives. 
Innovative industrial policy embedding these principles can accelerate 
structural change towards more productive and dynamic activities in the 
economy (Altenburg, 2011). This can lead to industrial growth, economic 
diversification and job creation. The State has a key role in this. In Chile, the 
State selectively promoted specific industries that had high growth potential. It 
provided sector specific incentives and protection which gave the private sector 
the incentive to start new industries. Some of these industries grew and some 
failed. Lessons were learned.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) argued for a 
dynamic industrial policy to transform economies by creating competitiveness of 
firms and protecting jobs in domestic economies (UNECA, 2014). The role of the 
State herein is important. To generate industrial growth requires nudges from 
the State (Kim, 1985). Industrial growth will result from policies and strategies 
that allow a State to play developmental roles in the economy This will enable 
the nurturing of policies and strategies that promote the State’s interaction with 
the private sector, develop an incentive and sanction regime with defined access 
rules and output indicators, and cultivate a favourable environment for growth 
and development benefiting the entire society (Rodrik, 2010). This was the 
experience in Chile, but has not been the case in Zambia.
For the purposes of our study we look at the experiences of Chile and 
Zambia. Chile has not only enjoyed a successful industrial growth process but, 
like Zambia, is resource rich. In 2013 it was ranked number 55 in the world in 
terms of its MVA per capita (UNIDO, 2013). Chile’s industrial growth experience, 
therefore, holds important lessons for Zambia. Insights on how it has managed 
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to generate a dynamic industrial base with interlinkages to the copper mining 
sector is of relevance to Zambia. 
Employment in Zambia
Zambia’s economy suffers from a severe unemployment problem. This is 
manifested by limited employment opportunities in the formal sector, and a 
burgeoning informal sector. Total formal sector employment rose by 257.5% 
in the fifty years since independence in 1964. This is against the backdrop of a 
rise in the total population of 280.6 %, (CSO, 2013). Inevitably, there has been a 
sharp rise in the labour force and the labour force participation rate over time. 
However, employment has not risen enough to keep up with the rise in the 
labour force, suggesting a rise in unemployment over time. Only 14% of the total 
labour force was formally employed in 2014. Most new jobs have been in the 
informal sector. These are mostly temporary and of a relatively poorer quality 
than formal sector jobs. To understand the employment situation over time, we 
analyse it in terms of four discernible episodes observed since independence 
(Chansa et al, 2016).
The first episode was the 1964-1984 period. During this time, formal 
employment increased by 37% from 264,100 in 1964 to 361,976 in 1984. 
The period was characterised by robust growth. The State implemented an 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and Zambianisation programme 
(Seidman, 1974; Ndulo, 1979; Fincham, 1980). This saw a large number of 
jobs created in sectors where state-owned companies were set up. However, as 
the industrialisation programme faltered, the jobs began to disappear (Ndulo, 
1979; Fincham, 1980). In the second episode, 1985 -1992, there was a spike 
in employment levels, that rose from 361,976 in 1984 to a peak of 544,200 
in 1991. This spike was driven by the ISI programme through initiatives such 
as growth from own resources (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1990). This implied using 
domestic resources to resolve the faltering economic situation. 
During the third episode, 1993-2003, the State implemented an economic 
reform programme, initially hesitantly but later hastily. Many state-owned 
companies closed down with widespread job losses. Between 2000 and 2003, 
formal employment declined further despite the rising GDP growth. One 
possible explanation for this was that the mining sector was beginning to revive 
and was gaining traction as the copper price was on an upward trend (Chansa et 
al., 2016). This drove GDP growth. Employment data shows that over this period 
employment in the mining sector increased by 39%, while that for construction 
and services declined by 75% and 21% respectively. Thus, overall employment 
declined despite the rise in GDP. 
The fourth episode was the 2004–2012 period. This exhibited an overall 
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rise in employment of 74%. This impressive rise in employment coincided with 
the return to robust growth with real GDP growth at 6.9% over the period. The 
mining sector drove the growth. The rebounding copper price reversed the 
fortunes of the sector with spillover effects to other sectors in the economy. This 
had a major impact on direct and indirect formal sector job creation. 
Sectorial decomposition shows that employment has largely been driven 
by the services sector(Chansa et al., 2016). For instance, between 1985 and 
2014, employment grew in all sectors of the economy. This was dominated by 
electricity, finance, and wholesale and retail trade. These also exhibited strong 
growth (Chansa et al., 2016). In most other sectors, employment contracted 
over the period. The construction sector experienced the largest contraction of 
51.6% followed by the transport and manufacturing sectors. These contracted 
at 36.2% and 24.8% respectively.
It is interesting to note that the manufacturing sector contributed 14.2% 
to total employment during the 1985-1989 period. Services and agriculture 
sector contributed larger shares at 29.8% and 15% respectively. In 2014, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for only 8.1% and has since been overtaken by 
the wholesale and retail sector. The latter is now the second largest contributor 
to total employment after the services sector. The contribution of the 
manufacturing sector in total employment has declined gradually over the entire 
period in contrast to the services sector whose contribution has continuously 
risen over this period. The change in fortunes for the manufacturing sector 
is partly explained by the failure of the state sponsored ISI programme and 
exacerbated by the post 1991 economic reforms as elaborated below. 
Performance of the Industrial Sector 
The performance of the manufacturing sector echoes the trends in employment 
observed above. The Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) as a percentage of 
GDP rose steadily from independence until 1992. It then fell sharply due to the 
collapse of the ISI and consequent closure of manufacturing firms. This is shown 
in Figure 11. Output shrank considerably both per capita and as a percentage 
of GDP. It was much more pronounced as a percentage of GDP. This is because 
while MVA contracted by 68.5% in the 1992-1994 period, GDP expanded by 
12.6% over the same period. MVA per worker has generally been on an upward 
trend since 2000. This is exhibited in Figure 2. This suggests that the average 
productivity of manufacturing labour has been growing steadily.
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Figure 1: MVA per Capita and MVA (% GDP): Zambia: 1965 - 2013
Source: World Bank (2014) 
What is more revealing is that, since 1995, the two trends seem to be 
moving in divergent directions. While MVA per capita seems to have returned 
to its upward trend, MVA as a percentage of GDP has continued to decline. One 
possible explanation for this observation is that while MVA has been growing 
modestly since 1995, this growth has been far outweighed by the growth in GDP 
hence causing the ratio to keep declining. Thus, the performance of the industrial 
sector has not kept pace with the performance of the overall econom.y
Figure 2: MVA per worker and MVA (%GDP): Zambia, 1965 - 2012
Source: World Bank (2014) and CSO Data
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The poor performance of the industrial sector is even more apparent when 
we compare with that of Chile. This is shown in Figures 3 and 4. Zambia’s MVA is 
stuck in the lower echelons while that of Chile seems to be growing. This trend 
is consistent with the findings of Meller and Simpasa (2011) 
Figure 3: MVA per Capita: Zambia and Chile, 1965 - 2012
Source: World Bank (2014). 
In Chile, the MVA as a percentage of GDP has grown continuously. This is 
shown in Figure 4. This is based on productivity gains and strong economic 
performance. In Zambia, this seems to have grown intermittently during 
the 1980s. This was due to increased manufacturing output under the ISI 
programme and contraction of GDP. This explains why Zambia’s MVA exhibited 
larger shares of GDP than in Chile in the 1986 to 1993 period. However, this 
trend for Zambia reversed after 1995 following the collapse of most SOEs in the 
manufacturing sector.
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Figure 4: Percentage Contribution of MVA to GDP: Zambia and Chile, 1965-2012.
Source: World Bank (2014) 
Manufacturing in Zambia is dominated by the food, beverages, and tobacco 
sectors. These contributed 67.6% of manufacturing GDP over the 1994-2012 
period. The remaining sectors contributed less than 35% of manufacturing GDP. 
The fact that this structure has persisted over a number of years illustrates the 
fact that the efforts to diversify manufacturing output has been met with little 
success. The share of the textiles sector in total manufacturing has declined 
from 13% in the early 1990s to less than 1% in 2011. 
Industrial Policy and Strategy in Zambia 
Zambia has oscillated with policy reforms since independence in 1964. 
Economic policies were initially liberal in the period after independence. They 
turned inward-looking in 1968 and turned to a virtually free market orientation 
in the early 1990s. In line with these changes, the country’s industrial policies 
have also varied from liberal market strategies, to a state-led industrialisation 
and back to free market strategies. We review the country’s industrial policies 
since 1964 under three phases structured around the initial industrial policies 
of 1964 to 1968, the second phase of inward-looking policies of 1968 to 1991, 
and conclude with the discussion of the post-1991 phase. 
The Initial Phase: 1964-1968
Zambia inherited a strong and one of the most prosperous economies in Africa 
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(Baldwin, 1965). It had an average annual per-capita income of US$500 and an 
average annual population growth rate of 3% (World Bank, 2014). Despite the 
strong economy, the human capital situation was desperate. There were fewer 
than one hundred university graduates and fewer than one thousand secondary 
school graduates (O’Brien, 1982). Further, the provision of public infrastructure 
was largely limited to urban areas mainly around mining towns. The economy 
was dominated by an industrial enclave focused on foreign financed copper 
mining, on which the high income was based2 (Baldwin, 1965).
The inherited industrial policy neglected the promotion of domestic 
industry. The manufacturing sector was small and mostly foreign-owned. 
Virtually all manufactured products were imported from abroad (Musonda and 
Adam, 1999; Mudenda, 2009; Hawkins, 1989). To address this situation, the new 
UNIP administration implemented the Transitional Development Plan (TDP) to 
accelerate development, create employment, and diversify the economy away 
from copper (Central Planning Office, 1965). The promotion of industrial growth 
was a means of diversifying the economy. Industrial policy remained relatively 
market-oriented. The State extended loans to the private sector through the 
Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). Between 1964 and 1968, 
INDECO expanded its loan portfolio to private firms from about K2 million in 
1964 to K16 million in 1967. However, Zambian entrepreneurs were scarce and 
marginalised. Few had the skills, capital and experience necessary to establish 
successful businesses (Craig, 1999; World Bank, 1984).
The First National Development Plan (FNDP) pursued objectives that 
emphasised the diversification of the economy, import substitution, increased 
employment, and reduction of inherited income inequalities between the rural 
and urban sectors. Resources were pushed into education, social welfare, and 
infrastructure. However, there was a worrisome perception of exploitation by 
foreign entrepreneurs in the business sector. This led to a change in strategy of 
how to organise the private sector. This was justified in the official “humanism 
ideology”, a socialist-oriented policy that focused on group ownership, 
redistributing income, and wealth rather than growth at the end of the 1960s 
(Makgetla, 1986; Hawkins 1991). 
The Second Phase: 1969-1991
In the late 1960s, the State was dissatisfied with the limited participation 
of indigenous Zambians in economic activities. The foreign-owned firms 
reinvested little and externalised all their dividends. The experience of the few 
state-owned enterprises under INDECO was positive. This incentivised the 
State to take controlling interests in existing private firms. Thus, through the 
Mulungushi and Matero Reforms, the State pursued public ownership of several 
Figure 4: Percentage Contribution of MVA to GDP: Zambia and Chile, 1965-2012.
Source: World Bank (2014) 
Manufacturing in Zambia is dominated by the food, beverages, and tobacco 
sectors. These contributed 67.6% of manufacturing GDP over the 1994-2012 
period. The remaining sectors contributed less than 35% of manufacturing GDP. 
The fact that this structure has persisted over a number of years illustrates the 
fact that the efforts to diversify manufacturing output has been met with little 
success. The share of the textiles sector in total manufacturing has declined 
from 13% in the early 1990s to less than 1% in 2011. 
Industrial Policy and Strategy in Zambia 
Zambia has oscillated with policy reforms since independence in 1964. 
Economic policies were initially liberal in the period after independence. They 
turned inward-looking in 1968 and turned to a virtually free market orientation 
in the early 1990s. In line with these changes, the country’s industrial policies 
have also varied from liberal market strategies, to a state-led industrialisation 
and back to free market strategies. We review the country’s industrial policies 
since 1964 under three phases structured around the initial industrial policies 
of 1964 to 1968, the second phase of inward-looking policies of 1968 to 1991, 
and conclude with the discussion of the post-1991 phase. 
The Initial Phase: 1964-1968
Zambia inherited a strong and one of the most prosperous economies in Africa 
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major companies (Turok, 1979; Craig 1999; Makgetla, 1986; Hawkins 1991). 
The main thrust of industrial policy was to promote industrial growth through 
State investment and State participation; this would further foster linkages 
across sectors (Musonda and Adam, 1999; Craig, 1999). The strategy initially 
targeted consumer goods such as food and beverages, wood and wood products, 
textiles and wearing apparel. Subsequently, large-scale state investments were 
automobile assembly, chemicals, and mineral products.
Under the Mulungushi Reforms, the State acquired 51% shares in most private 
companies. Several manufacturing, hotel, and mining firms were later nationalised. 
New state-owned firms were established. A number of manufacturing firms 
were established in remote regions to promote rural industrialisation even if, at 
times, they did not make economic sense. By the mid-1970s, State involvement 
extended to areas as diverse as manufacturing, agriculture, mining, banking and 
finance, retail trade, and tourism. By 1975, a relatively large share of industrial 
output came from heavy industries such as chemicals, mineral products, metal 
industries, and motor vehicle assembly. This was supported by revenues from high 
copper prices during the period 1969 – 1975. The manufacturing GDP grew at an 
average of 11% per annum. Its share in GDP increased from 6% in 1964 to 18% 
in 1975. State-owned enterprises contributed over 54% of the manufacturing 
GDP (Makgetla, 1986; World Bank 1984; Hawkins 1989). This was supported by 
revenues from copper during the period 1969 – 1975. 
Further, the State intensified its regulation of the private sector. Private 
businesses, especially foreign–owned, were not allowed to grow beyond 
prescribed sizes and were often restricted to specific geographical locations 
and areas of operation. State-owned enterprises were mandated to produce 
important and strategic goods. A Prices and Incomes Commission was 
established to control prices. FDI in key sectors required government approval 
and licensing. The licences stipulated conditions such as the size, location and 
products that firms could produce (World Bank, 1984; Bhagavan, 1978). 
Industrial growth was further spurred by the trade sanctions on Rhodesia, 
a key source of imports, following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965. The sanctions created effective protection to domestic industry. 
The import deficit stimulated domestic production to meet domestic demand 
(Ndulo, 2015; World Bank 1984). The import substitution industries were also 
supported through incentives such as guaranteed government procurement of 
products from these firms. 
To support industrial growth, the State designed a complex trade policy 
regime. This comprised a mix of high and cascading tariffs (ranging from 0% for 
capital goods to 150% for final consumer goods). An import licensing system 
with quantitative restrictions was introduced as part of industrial policy. These 
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policies led to the expansion of the industrial base, which was ranked third in 
Sub-Saharan Africa at the time (Faroutan, 1993). The growth of the SOEs was 
associated with rapid increases in formal employment. Between 1969 and 
1975, formal employment in SOEs increased at an average of 12% per annum 
(World Bank, 1984). In 1975, the SOEs contributed over 50% of manufacturing 
employment. However, this employment trend stagnated as the economic crisis 
set in after the mid-1970s. It picked up in the mid-1980s. 
This industrial growth had inherent weaknesses that constrained its 
sustained growth (Hawkins, 1991; Seshamani, 1994;). Firstly, inputs in many 
industries, such as chemicals and automobile assembly were very import 
intensive. They also used foreign technology with limited adaptability to local 
conditions. This generated limited linkages to the rest of the domestic economy. 
Secondly, the shortage of local skilled and educated workers was a major 
problem. The shortage was worse at the operational and managerial levels. The 
companies had to rely on expatriates to manage the SOEs. With the economic 
crisis after 1975, SOEs could not attract and retain skilled personnel (World 
Bank, 1984). 
Thirdly, most SOEs remained inefficient. They relied on State budget support 
and on cross-subsidisation of loss-making companies by profitable ones through 
a complex organization of holding companies. This created complacency which 
affected performance. The situation was exacerbated in the mid-1970s, when 
the economy experienced adverse shocks from falling copper prices and rising 
import prices (Makgetla, 1986; Musonda and Adam, 1999). 
With a narrow tax base, the contribution of copper to state revenues fell 
drastically from about 51% in the period immediately after independence to 
an average of 10% between 1982 and 1991. The contribution to GDP fell from 
36% to under 15% (Musonda and Adam, 1999). This made it difficult to sustain 
the loss-making firms. Furthermore, foreign exchange shortages and the rise 
in import prices reduced the economy’s capacity to import by almost 50% in 
the mid-1980s. This affected the importation of spare parts and inputs in the 
private sector and adversely affected capacity utilisation. The economic crisis 
generated an insurmountable deficit in the balance of payments, exacerbated by 
Zambia’s landlocked location which contributed to high transport costs (Craig, 
1999; Seshamani,1994; Hawkins 1989).
To resolve the foreign exchange shortages, the State centralised the 
allocation of foreign exchange. Priority was given to SOEs which made them 
complacent in their pursuit of efficiency and profits (Seshamani, 1994). 
The consequent overvaluation of the Kwacha fostered cheaper imports of 
intermediate inputs and consumer goods. This effectively served as a tax that 
reduced the competitiveness of exports in the international market.
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Despite the poor performance of SOEs after 1975, the State was only 
concerned with maintaining employment levels in the sector. It vetoed any 
closures that would result in large-scale redundancies. The inefficient SOEs 
were supported by the State to maintain employment even in difficult times. 
Consequently, worker productivity in SOEs fell by an average of 14% between 
1975 and the mid-1980s (World Bank, 1984). 
The poor performance was exacerbated by direct and indirect political 
interventions. This was done through the State and the ruling party’s 
participation on various boards that determined investment projects3. For 
example, industries were established in remote regions without consideration 
of trade costs and internal market access. This limited the competitiveness of 
these products in international markets. 
However, the private sector remained important in sectors where the State 
did not crowd it out, but remained constrained by the dominance of the SOEs. It 
had to bear similar costs as the SOEs such as low external competitiveness due 
to the overvalued exchange rate. It had little support from the State. The private 
sector was heavily taxed to support the public sector. It had far less access to 
foreign exchange than SOEs. Often the private businesses survived and received 
incentives on personal contacts with State agencies or assistance from business 
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. There was no proper 
structure for state-private sector dialogue (Hawkins, 1991). There were no clear 
procedures for the private firms to access incentives. 
In the early 1970s the State neglected the promotion of private small and 
medium scale enterprises (SME). There was an effort to correct this deficiency in 
the 1981 SME Act. Thereafter, there was a discernible effort to support small scale 
firms in the private sector. This was aimed at expanding output and employment 
to boost incomes, and foster rural development (Chansa et al., 2016).
What is discernible from the policies between 1968 and the late 1980s is 
that the State worked to crowd out the private sector rather than complement it, 
through the resolution of market failures and the coordination of markets. Three 
major adverse shocks undermined the strategy. Firstly, the deterioration of the 
terms of trade as a result of the fall in copper prices and rise in oil prices made it 
difficult for the State to generate sufficient resources to sustain SOEs. Secondly, 
the economy suffered as a result of conflicts among neighbours, which increased 
the transportation costs of imports and exports. Finally, the State response 
to the crises was to maintain consumption at the expense of investment. The 
State delayed adjustment and used external borrowing to resolve the crises. 
This resulted in the deterioration of the economic disequilibrium such as large 
budget deficits, external debt, shortages of foreign exchange, and inflationary 
pressures. 
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To mitigate the disequilibria, the State resorted to increased controls 
and regulations such as foreign exchange and price controls. It was hesitant 
to adjust and reform the economy. Industrial policy and strategy remained 
highly politicised and without any complementary policies such as technical 
skills training for industrial and technological upgrading. The shortage of 
skilled labour contributed to the weak performance of the industrial sector. 
The business environment remained antagonistic to private investors with no 
meaningful structure for state-private sector dialogue,
The Third Phase: 1991 and thereafter
After several policy reversals and hesitation to reform, the State, in 1989, started 
to implement far reaching policy reforms. A new industrial policy to promote 
the private sector was promulgated. Institutional arrangements were made 
to oversee the process to privatise almost all SOEs. This period also coincided 
with the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1991 which saw a change 
in the administration of the State from UNIP to the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD).
The MMD administration strongly pushed the reform agenda further under 
the economy-wide structural adjustment programme. The reforms were swift 
and far reaching. They replaced interest rates and price controls with market-
determined policies aimed at restoring economic efficiency and growth in the 
economy. Domestic and foreign trade was liberalised. 
The practice of industrial policy witnessed a drastic change as outlined in the 
Policy Framework Paper (White, 1997). Industrial growth was now to be pursued 
through a market-driven and outward-oriented strategy. The policy eliminated 
all industrial licensing (except for essential registration) for all levels of private 
investment. The privatisation of SOEs was emphasised. The State committed itself 
to privatising over 300 SOEs. Between 1992 and 1998, many SOEs in wholesale 
and retail trade, tourism, manufacturing, and mining sectors were privatised.4 
Meanwhile budget support to loss-making enterprises was withdrawn.
The 1994 industrial policy document concretised the new policy. This 
was revised in 2010 and 2015, albeit with minor difference. The objective 
was to support private industries that maximised the use of domestic inputs 
and fostered linkages within the manufacturing sector and the rest of the 
economy. The industrial sector was to contribute to the diversification of the 
economy through exports of value added products. FDI was to be encouraged 
to stimulate exports and induce innovation and technological transfer into the 
economy. Several sectors were identified as growth sectors; food and beverages, 
engineering products, wood products, leather, textiles and clothing (Mudenda, 
2009, Chansa et al., 2016) 
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To nurture industrial growth, the State pushed for a conducive environment 
for the private sector to thrive. Thus, not only was trade liberalised, but the 
current and capital accounts were also opened. The tariff structure was 
rationalised and simplified. Several incentives such as tax holidays and low 
tariffs on capital equipment and raw materials were provided to the private 
sector in an ad hoc manner. 
In 2005, another industrial strategy was initiated. This focused on 
establishing multi-facility economic zones (MFEZ) under the supervision of the 
Zambia Development Agency (ZDA). The purpose was to make the industrial 
sector competitive through increased domestic and FDI in manufacturing for 
exports. The investors in these selected areas are provided with complementary 
physical infrastructure, customs and tax incentives as a way of fostering 
industrial growth (Chansa et al., 2016). Unlike the experience from South 
Korea, where the MFEZs are built on demand from the private sector, the zones 
in Zambia are driven by a political agenda. There is very little involvement or 
demand from the private sector. Furthermore, the zones lack a coordinated 
and all-encompassing supply of complementary services such as skilled labour, 
power supply, and established infrastructure (Chansa et al., 2016). 
The State has also established a state-owned credit institution, the Citizens 
Economic Empowerment Commission (CEEC) to foster the growth of locally-
owned SMEs. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was also re-
established in 2014 as a holding company of all SOEs. Its objective is to secure 
investment funds and promote industrial growth. The governance structure 
of IDC does not drastically deviate from the initial INDECO board. The board 
comprises influential political figures. Among them are three cabinet ministers, 
the Secretary to the Treasury, and the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Commerce Trade and Industry (all appointed by the Republican president). 
There are some members from the private sector. The president chairs all the 
board meetings. 
Areas for Industrial Growth and Job Creation
The Zambian State has formulated policies and strategies to foster industrial 
growth. It has pursued many policies and programmes over the years. However, 
these have not been dovetailed to job creation, institution building, and sector 
specificity. Therefore, compared to Chile, there has been a poor record of 
developing specific, viable, and implementable policy strategies to realise the 
opportunities inherent in the key areas inhibiting growth. This has limited 
industrial growth and job creation. What are these key areas whose nurturing 
can enhance industrial growth and job creation? We focus on three of them. These 
are youth unemployment, sectorial policies and institutions, and agribusiness. 
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Youth unemployment 
In Zambia, youth unemployment is a serious problem and currently at an 
average of 18%. Therefore, it is imperative that a sustainable industrial policy 
fosters jobs for the youth. Not only is there an urgent need for more youth 
employment, but also a need for these jobs to be sustainable. While this paper 
focuses on job creation holistically, it also looks at how Chile approached 
the problem of youth unemployment and illuminates the valuable lessons 
for Zambia; (i) the different mechanisms Chile used to create better and 
sustainable jobs, and (ii) how they ensured that the youth acquired the skills 
necessary for various industries. 
Sectorial Policies and Institutions
Today, Zambia faces challenges in fostering private sector growth and prosperity 
through public policies despite having identified key sectors for growth. 
Additionally, the State has not been successful in realising the opportunities 
inherent in the identified areas. This is largely due to lack of comprehensive 
and viable policy strategies, or lack of institutional capacity and political will. 
A clear understanding is needed on how Chile supported specific sectors of the 
economy, while at the same time avoiding the risk of creating “white elephants”, 
how State support can be linked to the expansion of industrial output in priority 
sectors and sustainable job creation and, lastly, what mechanisms have been 
used for supporting the different sectors, which reduces the risk of rent seeking, 
weakened governance, government failures, and corruption.
Agribusiness 
One relevant sector that has been considered important for potential growth 
and job creation for Zambia is the agribusiness sector. Agribusiness could create 
employment and generate incomes along the value chain from the primary 
producer to the consumer. It can widen the tax base, and increase foreign 
exchange earnings (GRZ, 2006). Therefore, understanding the barriers to the 
expansion of agribusiness and what Chile has done to overcome these barriers 
is important for Zambia. The key questions asked are: (i) What has Chile done to 
ensure private sector growth and job creation in the sector? (ii) How to identify 
potential agribusiness sectors and what are the main barriers to expanding 
agribusiness? (iii) Which specific policies have allowed Chile to overcome these 
barriers? 
Industrial Policy and Strategy in Chile
We look at industrial growth in Chile to draw some lessons from its experiences. 
We examine the role the State played in promoting industrial growth and 
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employment creation. We seek lessons on the key areas of youth unemployment, 
sectorial policies and institutions and sector specific policy formulation for 
growth and job creation, focusing on the agribusiness sector. 
The involvement of the private sector in the creation of quality jobs is 
recognised in the development literature. Industrial growth is crucial in this. As 
stated earlier, industrial policy is not only a list of specific policies, but it is also 
a state of mind that mandates collaboration between the State and the private 
sector (Rodrik, 2010). We therefore look, at how the State, through industrial 
policy, engaged the private sector to spur industrial growth and create jobs. The 
experience of a mineral resource-based country, such as Chile, in ensuring a 
successful industrialisation process is relevant to the growth process in Zambia. 
Chile grew from a low-income to a high-income country since the 1960s. 
During that time, it sustained positive growth rates. In the 1970s, Chile pursued 
protectionist policies with high tariffs to spur its industrial growth. This 
strategy led to shortages of foreign exchange, high inflation and declining GDP. 
It, however, spurred some industries but stunted export growth, especially in 
products like copper and salmon. In the mid-1970s, the country changed its 
stance and carried out major reforms. The economy was liberalised, SOEs were 
privatised and sustained efforts were made to control inflation. The reforms 
were implemented in three phases; 1974-83, 1985, and 1990. These were later 
continued and strengthened after 1990. The State focused on international 
trade to revive the economy. It promoted exports of copper, silver, wine, salmon, 
seafood, and lumber. These policies were continued by the post-Pinochet 
administrations. 
To spur industrial growth, the State encouraged experimentation, learning 
by doing, R&D, accumulation of tacit knowledge, and innovation. It developed 
an institutional framework for industrial policy that addressed market failures 
and innovation. Innovation was treated as an explicit policy goal. The focus 
on state-supported innovation was concentrated in specific sectors where the 
country had existing, or potential, comparative advantage and therefore had 
strong growth prospects. 
The innovation practices pursued commercial application of ideas that 
were at the frontier of knowledge and introduced set ideas that were being 
used elsewhere (self-discovery). This was funded through the Corporacion 
de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile (CORFO) and the Consejo Nacional de 
Investigacionen Ciencia y Technology (CONYCIT). The former subsidised the 
demand for innovation and the latter subsidised the supply of knowledge by 
universities and research centers. Innovation was funded from the State budget 
and the mineral royalty tax. Tax rebates were offered to R&D activities and to 
FDI in high technology sectors. 
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CORFO was established to increase innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
competitiveness in the economy (USAID, 2009). It controls INNOVACHILE, which 
is in charge of the application of the country’s innovation policies to increase 
competitiveness. INNOVACHILE provides grants to companies and technological 
centres. This funding depends on risk, innovation potential, economic potential 
and externalities and the degree of collaborative effort. 
R&D activities benefited from tax credit and tax-deductible allowances. This 
implied that much of R&D expenditures was paid for by the State. Furthermore, 
all types of R&D expenditures were allowed. This could be performed in-house, 
by third parties, or partially done in a foreign country. 
The State targeted sectors that had already demonstrated comparative 
advantage and showed strong growth prospects. It built on those successes by 
introducing advanced technology into production. It focused on upstream or 
downstream activities of the selected sectors. The sectors targeted were copper 
mining, aquaculture, fruit production, beef, pork, and poultry, and off shoring 
services. 
The specific sector strategy in mining, was to move towards engineering 
services (upstream), or chemicals for mining, or mining machinery 
(downstream), rather than focusing only on the export of ore. In other words, 
because of the strong specialisation in natural resources, Chile had acquired 
particular skills and technologies in mining (e.g. mining-related engineering 
services). This took advantage of the proliferation of global value chains. Mining-
related engineering services were exported. This loosened the link between 
copper prices and the country’s export performance. The strong position in 
the upstream segments of the copper value chains made it possible to add 
other activities, such as further chemical or manufacturing processing, to its 
raw copper products. In fisheries, the State adopted Norwegian technology in 
salmon production in 1981. This was after several failed attempts throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s to grow trout and salmon. Salmon exports increased from 
about US$1 million to about US$159 million in 1991 and US$2.4 billion in 2008. 
Chile is now the second largest salmon exporter in the world. This was also the 
experience with the blueberry sector, which was established in the 1980s and is 
now a major export product. 
Over the years, the country faced challenges with institutional capacity. The 
State responded by putting up mechanisms that would allow the economy to 
overcome these. For example, when the State was setting up new industries, 
CORFO facilitated the training of managers and key personnel abroad. In the 
case of salmon production, CORFO provided the funds for people to go to 
Norway to acquire skills.
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Employment Creation and the State 
Chile has faced youth unemployment. Young people aged between 15 to 29 
years represent about 40% of the working population. Youth unemployment 
was on average 2.5 times higher than that of adults in the 1980s. Informality in 
employment was much higher among the youth than adults (UNESCO, 2012). 
The advent of liberal reforms led to a spike in unemployment. The youth were 
more adversely affected by the reforms because they had low levels of human 
capital formation. However, youth unemployment declined over time from 
30.5% in 1980, 22.7% in 1985 and 13.1% in 1990. It stood at 16.1% in 2012 
(World Bank, 2012). This shows that youth unemployment has significantly 
reduced. We can learn valuable lessons on how this was accomplished. 
The high youth unemployment emanated from the uneven distribution 
of opportunities provided by the education system. Youth with the lowest 
levels of formal education, mostly from poor families had the highest risk of 
unemployment. The economic reforms created a stock of young people from 
poor families, with inadequate levels of human capital. These were marginalized 
and exposed to high-risk behaviours such as crime, drugs and violence (Aedo, 
2004). 
To address the problems associated with youth unemployment, the State 
started schemes oriented towards the youth. Notable among these schemes 
were the Chile Joven and the Extra21(Chansa et al., 2016). The schemes 
designed special training programmes outside the framework of the traditional 
mechanism to equip youths with the right skills (Vezza, 2013). Furthermore, a 
number of methods to support youth employment or to address labour demand 
barriers were used. Incentives were given to employers to address the scarce 
demand for young workers. These were based on legislation such as the uneven 
minimum wage, the wage subsidy and reduced social security contributions 
(Chansa et al., 2016).
 
Sectorial Policies and Institutions
Chile’s industrial policy focused on resolving specific market failures that 
affected the economy, improving productivity and raising the technological 
content of existing sectors. A number of market failures were identified. These 
were credit constraints affecting SMEs, dearth of university students from low-
income households, labour training, the public goods nature of some types of 
export promotion activities, and innovation. 
The State supported specific sectors through the activities of an 
entrepreneurial institution called Fundacion Chile (FCh). FCh acted as a venture 
capitalist. It promoted innovation and self-discovery. It set companies in new 
sectors of the economy. These were later sold off to the private sector (e.g. the 
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salmon project). It also promoted partnerships with private investors with a 
clear exit strategy. The Agency concentrated in six natural resource abundant 
sectors. These were agribusiness, marine resources, forestry, environment 
and chemical metrology, human capital, and information and communication 
technologies. In the marine, forestry, and agribusiness sectors, it promoted 
commercial projects that utilised technologies that were not in use in Chile 
(Alvarez et al., 2003). Examples are the salmon and blueberry industries. 
The State provided financial and technical support for MSEs through Fondo 
de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios (FOGAPE). Access to credit was a major 
constraint facing MSEs because of the lack of collateral and a track record of 
timely repayment. FOGAPE guaranteed a certain percentage of the credit granted 
by financial institutions to MSEs, small exporters, and organisations of small 
businesses. The guarantees were used to secure credit for working capital and 
investment projects. Small business associations could use the guarantees for 
infrastructure investment, purchase of equipment, and irrigation and drainage 
projects.
The costs to the State of the FOGAPE programme were estimated to 
be negligible. The State provided a subsidised loan preparation scheme for 
micro enterprises. This increased access to bank credit by many formal micro 
enterprises (Agosin et al., 2009). The State subsidised new exporters and 
supported the selected sectors in a manner that reduced risks of rent seeking, 
poor governance and corruption. Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la 
Competitividad (CNIC) was set up to create platforms useful for several sectors 
(e.g., the development of a venture capital segment of the capital markets) and 
to undertake strategic bets on specific industries. To minimise rent seeking and 
benefit capture by bureaucratic interests, the Council was made permanent and 
its members nominated by the president and ratified by the Senate. The term 
of office of the councilors would not coincide with that of the president. This 
would help avoid problems of political patronage and interference. The Council 
consisted of academicians, business leaders, and high government officials. This 
was to ensure checks-and-balances to policy making. 
Agribusiness 
Chile identified potential growth sectors in the economy. It looked for sectors 
that were within reach, given the country’s existing or potential comparative 
advantage, and had strong growth prospects. Agribusiness was one such sector. 
The country faced a number of challenges in developing the agribusiness 
sector. These required a mix of interventions to resolve them. There were 
coordination problems which made it difficult for the sector to take off. It was 
difficult to attract private investment. Firms lacked access to credit. In the early 
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1970s most of the firms were SMEs. These were considered high risk and denied 
credit by the banks. There was also a lack of human capital in the sector. There 
were not enough workers with the required skills and in some cases, none. This 
meant that productivity was very low. There was poor infrastructure and low 
mechanisation.
The State designed policies to resolve the coordination problem. These 
included actions that addressed legal constraints. It introduced subsidies to 
attract private investment to the sector. A loan guarantee scheme under FOGAPE 
was introduced to resolve the problem of access to credit. The guarantee scheme 
reduced risks that banks faced when lending to agribusiness SMEs. There were 
deliberate efforts to provide human capital for the sector. This involved targeted 
training and acquisition of skills required for the various agribusiness firms. 
This was necessary to raise productivity. 
The State used a combination of channels to get this done. It sent managers 
and employees abroad, for example to Norway, to learn the practical skills in 
salmon production. Workers learned how to adapt Norwegian technology 
to Chilean conditions in the early days of the salmon industry. Furthermore, 
the State and the private sector invested significant resources to train skilled 
professionals in the industry. The State facilitated training programmes in 
biochemistry, pathology, engineering, business administration, and aquaculture, 
among others. This was done at local universities. In addition, the Salmon 
Institute of Technology (INTESAL) provided training for workers. There were 
fiscal incentives that enabled firms to claim tax deductions on expenses incurred 
in the training of workers (UNCTAD, 2006).
The State also strengthened agricultural production to support the 
development of the agribusiness sector. It provided subsidies to farmers. For 
instance, farmers received subsidies to install or improve existing irrigation 
systems on their farms. Communities and regions benefited from off-farm irrigation 
investments made by the State. There was also a soil recovery programme. This 
provided subsidies to finance activities to recover or improve degraded soil. 
Some of these activities included: phosphate fertiliser applications to restore the 
natural level of soil fertility; calcium fertiliser applications; the establishment and 
regeneration of grasslands; soil conservation, and crop rotation. 
Subsidies were provided to improve access to credit and an agriculture 
insurance programme was introduced. A subsidy was given to farmers who took 
out crop insurance. Risks covered were those caused by climate hazards such as 
drought, excess or untimely rains, hail storms, snow, and wind. The eligible crops 
included cereals, industrial crops, vegetables, and legumes. There were also 
subsidies aimed at improving the productive, managerial and entrepreneurship 
capabilities of small scale farmers (OECD, 2008).
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Specific Lessons for Zambia 
Chile provides a rich experience that Zambia can learn from. What are these 
lessons? We look at these lessons in respect of the key areas for Zambia, whose 
resolution is labour intensive and would create increased job opportunities. 
These are youth unemployment, sectorial policies and strategies, and support 
to the agribusiness sector. 
Youth Unemployment 
There are important lessons on how to manage the problem of youth 
unemployment. Chile used different mechanisms at different times to resolve 
youth unemployment. How did they ensure that youths acquired the right skills 
for industry and that there was no skills mismatch? The key lessons are those 
from strategies that overcame labour demand barriers for youth and the need 
for comprehensive skills training.
The first lesson is that to resolve the youth unemployment problem there 
is need for strategies that overcome labour demand barriers for the youth. 
This requires a combination of interventions that stimulate labour demand. 
The youth are endowed with lower levels of tacit knowledge or know-how 
compared to adults. This implies that the youth tend to have lower productivity 
than adults. It is this perceived lower productivity that discourages firms from 
hiring them. Therefore, in order to encourage firms to hire the youth, they have 
to be given incentives to compensate for the lower productivity. 
Chile used a combination of interventions to stimulate demand for youth 
employment. They introduced a variable minimum wage policy. This stipulated 
a lower minimum wage for anyone aged below 19 years. They also put in place 
wage subsidies for any firm employing the youth. The State intervened through 
the payroll scheme to lower pension contributions for the youth. All of these 
interventions were aimed at reducing the perceived cost of hiring a youth and 
thus stimulate demand for youth labour. 
The second lesson is that it is important to conduct skills surveys to see what 
is needed and then adopt a comprehensive skills training approach. Identifying 
the skills gap is a starting point to resolving youth unemployment. The training 
initiatives must involve the private sector. In Chile, the State carried out surveys 
to identify the type of skills that employers needed and matched them to the 
needs of the youth. They initiated free training schemes for both technical and 
soft skills for diverse types of youth beneficiaries. Training was offered mostly 
at the semi-skilled level. Internships were encouraged and they put in place job 
counselors for the youth. In order to encourage the firms to carry out training 
upgrades for their workers, the State made the expense incurred by a firm on 
training to upgrade the skills of workers tax deductible. In short, Chile adopted 
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a comprehensive approach to ensuring that the youth are equipped with the 
right skills. 
Sector Policies and Strategies 
There are important lessons that have emerged from Chile concerning the 
pursuit of sector policies. This is in respect to actual policies, initiatives and 
strategies. We discuss these in respect to six major lessons learned. These are 
the need to identify key sectors to support, the coordination and monitoring of 
selected sectors, the opening up of new sectors, the framework for supporting 
SMEs, investment in R & D, and the lack of institutional capacity. 
First, there is need to identify key sectors to support. The principle of 
comparative and competitive advantage should be the guiding principle. This 
requires a systematic strategy to identify sectors to support. The argument is 
that in the context of a finite resource envelope, concentrating resources in a 
few sectors with growth potential will have a large impact on the economy and 
employment creation.
In Chile, the State set up companies in new sectors of the economy. It would 
later sell them off to the private sector. The salmon and blueberry industries are 
examples. The State also technically and financially supported SMEs. It designed 
loan guarantee schemes and subsidised loan applications. 
The experience from Chile suggests that by focusing on the economy’s 
comparative and competitive advantage, the State will inadvertently foster labour-
intensive industrial growth that creates jobs. Chile focused on increasing production 
and exports of mining, agricultural, fishing and forest products. These were labour-
intensive. It targeted sectors which had already demonstrated a comparative 
advantage and had strong growth prospects in the international economy. The drive 
was to build on those successes by introducing advanced technology into production 
and by moving upstream or downstream of the value chain. For example, for copper 
mining, moving upstream meant going into fine cable production while moving 
downstream meant going into production of chemicals used in mining operations.
Once sectors were selected, there are lessons to be learned from the 
coordination and monitoring of the sectors. One has to effect a strategy that 
allows for coordination and continued monitoring of supported sectors. This is 
likely to ensure efficiency in the implementation of the support to the sectors, 
make it possible for early detection of potential problems with the support 
process, and allow for adjustments to be made. 
In Chile, the coordination was a responsibility of a council. The council was 
a permanent body whose membership was assigned to academics, business 
leaders, and high government officials. This was in order to ensure checks-and-
balances to policy making. 
Frank Chansa, Ngao Mubanga, Dale Mudenda and Manenga Ndulo
23
The third lesson is a strategy of opening new sectors. The State has an 
important role to play in opening up sectors which may initially have been 
perceived to have an unfavorable risk to return profile by the private sector. 
Experience from Chile has demonstrated that economies usually have certain 
sectors where the chances of setting up a successful company may be very 
low for a variety of reasons such as lack of expert know-how in that sector, 
uncertainty about markets, lack of infrastructure, etc. In such cases setting 
up a company for the first, second, or third time may not result in a profitable 
venture. In other words, the rate of failure may be unusually high. In such cases, 
it requires someone prepared to persevere in the face of many unsuccessful 
attempts. Faced with such high rates of failure, the private firms are usually 
unwilling to lead the way in such a situation. The State can give a nudge. 
In Chile, the State set up new firms in certain sectors by itself or in 
partnership with the private sector with an exit strategy. For example, if the 
State set up a firm in a sector by itself, then it must ensure that once this new 
firm is viable, the State sells it to the private sector. By so doing, the State has 
led the way in opening up this sector (i.e. demonstration effect) and at the same 
time has avoided the risk of creating a “white elephant”. This is what happened 
in the case of salmon cultivation. The State sold the firm to a Japanese firm after 
it had demonstrated that the activity was viable. Similarly, if the State decides to 
set up a new firm in a sector in partnership with the private sector, it must enter 
into an agreement with private partners to eventually buy out the equity stake 
of the State in the venture. This was the case in blueberry fruit production.
The fourth lesson is the need for a framework to support SMEs. The lack of 
access to credit has been identified as a major constraint facing SMEs. This is 
explained by the fact that SMEs are generally viewed as high risk clients and as 
such banks and other financial institutions will only deal with them if they are 
able to charge higher interests. This inevitably reduces the ability of the SMEs 
to access credit.
Experiences from Chile suggests that the State created mechanisms for 
supporting SMEs both technically and financially. The State created a loan 
guarantee scheme to help reduce the perceived risk of lending to the SMEs. This 
enabled them to borrow at lower interest rates from the commercial banks. It 
also provided technical assistance to the SMEs through extension services and 
subsidised the loan application process.
The fifth lesson is that investment in R&D is critical to spur industrial 
growth. R&D investment is costly. There is, therefore, need for the State to have 
a clear R&D funding strategy. The State must foster experimentation, learning by 
doing, research and development, accumulation of tacit knowledge, innovation, 
technology adoption and adaptation. There are two approaches in organising 
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R&D efforts. A focus on new inventions and technologies and adopting already 
established technologies. The State rigorously pushed for R&D. It focused on 
undertaking and adopting already established technologies. This might be the 
most relevant and practicable for Zambia.
Chile offered incentives for R&D. The State treated innovation as an explicit 
policy goal in their development agenda. This focused on specific sectors given 
the country’s existing or potential comparative advantage. It had two channels 
of funding innovation. The State subsidised the demand for innovation and 
subsidised the supply of knowledge by universities and research centres. 
Resources for innovation came from the State budget and the mineral royalty 
tax. In order for innovation to succeed, there must be policies geared to stimulate 
both the supply and demand for innovation. Equally important is the fact that 
the State must have a clear funding strategy for R&D and innovation. 
Lastly, the sixth lesson is what to do in situations where there is a lack of 
institutional capacity. In this case the State should find mechanisms of learning 
from other countries. Chile sent people abroad to learn. This was done in the 
cultivation of salmon. Chile sent people to Norway to learn how to adapt the 
technology used in the sector.
Development of the Agribusiness Sector.
Lastly, we draw lessons on how the State in Chile identified potential agribusiness 
sectors. What are the main barriers to expanding the agribusiness sector? Which 
specific policies can overcome these barriers? Here, there are two important 
lessons for Zambia. This is in the identification of potential agribusiness sectors 
and in the monitoring of incentives.
Firstly, the identification of potential agribusiness sectors should be 
done within the framework of comparative and competitive advantage. The 
identification of potential agribusiness sectors in Chile was done in much the 
same way as general sector identification was done. This was by considering 
the comparative and competitive advantage of the various agribusiness 
sectors. There was coordination between the State and the private sector in 
the identification process. The State looked at activities that were within reach, 
given the country’s existing or potential comparative advantage, and that had 
strong growth prospects. Secondly, a number of barriers to the development of 
agribusiness have been identified. Some of these are access to credit and finance, 
lack of infrastructure such as transport and storage, lack of human capital, 
insecure policy environment, low mechanisation, and poor coordination. 
The way that the country tried to overcome these constraints is noteworthy. 
This involved a number of interventions. For instance, subsidies were provided 
to improve access to credit, subsidies for improving irrigation systems and 
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soil recovery programmers. The aim was to encourage more private sector 
investment. There was also a deliberate effort to invest in human capital required 
for the respective agribusiness sectors. The State, through local universities, 
carried out training programmes for workers. Other institutions such as the 
Salmon Institute of Technology also carried out training of workers. Subsidies 
were provided that aimed at improving the productive, managerial, and 
entrepreneurship capabilities of small scale farmers. The State also embarked 
on proper planning and coordination to ensure that the incentives are having 
the desired impact. Equally important, there was political commitment at the 
highest level to move the sector forward.
Zambia and Chile evolved different industrial policies and strategies over 
time. Chile managed to transform its industrial structure, while Zambia failed to 
do so. Chile garnered the developmental nature of the State to play a critical role 
in the industrialisation of the country. These policies and strategies hinged on 
the State’s interaction with the private sector, the nature of the incentives and 
sanctions regime, and on how to share broadly the benefits from the growth 
process.
Endnotes
1 The manufacturing sector is composed of the following sub-sectors: food, beverages 
and tobacco; textile and leather industries; wood and wood products; paper and paper 
products; chemicals, rubber and plastic products; non-metallic mineral products; basic 
metal products and fabricated metal products.
2 The mines were mainly financed by capital from the U.S.A and the United Kingdom.
3 Although efforts to depoliticise boards and management of SOEs were made in the 1980s, 
political interventions through State appointments to key positions remained rampant.
4 The process of privatisation involves the dismantling of the corporate structures through 
which enterprises were held in the state sector and the development of these within the 
private sector. The business community that preferred privatisation was well represented 
in the MMD government, this made it easier to accept such radical changes.
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